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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-293(k).
ONYX'S STATEMENT OF ISSUES
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Onyx1 presents the following issues for review, under the standards as stated:
1)

Did the trial court err in holding Onyx liable for conversion where, at the

time Onyx Acceptance Corp. ("Onyx") directed that the subject vehicle be repossessed
from Plaintiff Chris Mahana ("Mahana"), Onyx held a certificate of title in California
showing Onyx as a perfected, secured creditor, and Rick Warner Toyota ("Rick
Warner"), a licensed vehicle dealer in Utah which, after purchasing the vehicle with a
laundered certificate of title issued in the State of Arizona, sold the vehicle to Mahana
before issuance of a certificate of title in the State of Utah? The trial court's decision, set
forth in its Order Ruling on Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment, (R.272), is a
conclusion of law based on interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-103(2)(d)(Supp.
1998) which is to be reviewed "under a correction of error standard, granting no
deference to the trial court." Lake Philgas Svc. v. Valley Bank & Trust Co., 845 P.2d 951,
955 (Utah App. 1993)(citing Marchant v. Park City, 111 P.2d 677, 680 (Utah App. 1989),
affd 788 P.2d 520 (Utah 1990)).

1

Appellants herein are Onyx and GLS, who were co-defendants below.
Appellants are completely aligned, with Onyx having indemnified GLS for its actions
regarding the repossession, and, in compliance with Utah R. App. P. 24(d), are
referred to jointly herein as "Onyx."
7

2)

Did the trial court err in awarding damages to Mahana in the amount of

$11,880 where (1) Mahana paid only $8,795 for the total purchase price of the vehicle
eleven months prior to the repossession, (2) Mahana was only without the use of his
vehicle for approximately eighteen months, and (3) Mahana had the use of suitable
substitute vehicles, free of charge, for the entire time he was without the use of the subject
vehicle? The trial court's method of assessing damages for conversion is a question of
law, and is thus subject to review for correctness, "granting] no particular deference to
the district court's rulings

" Carlie v. Morgan, 922 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1996); see,

Lysenko v. Sawaya, 7 P.3d 783, 787-89 (Utah 2000).
3)

Did the trial court err in applying the collateral source rule, thereby

disallowing Onyx the benefit of the bond payment that was made to Plaintiffs,2 where the
bond was for the purpose of protecting parties, including Onyx, that would be injured by
the improper issuance of a "laundered" certificate of title? The trial court's decision to
give Plaintiffs the benefit of payment from Merchants Bonding Company ("Merchants
Bonding"), without allowing Onyx any credit therefore, is a question of law, and
therefore reviewed for correctness, "granting] no particular deference to the district
court's rulings . . . ." Carlie, 922 P.2d at 3; see, Gibbs M. Smith, Inc. v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 949 P.2d 337, 345 (Utah 1997), Haueter v. Peguillan, 586 P.2d
403,404-45 (Utah 1978).

2

Plaintiffs/Appellees are Rick Warner and Mahana. For ease of reference,
when mentioned jointly herein they are referred to as Plaintiffs.
8

4)

Did the trial court err in assessing punitive damages against Onyx for

directing that the subject vehicle be repossessed, when at that time of repossession Onyx
held a certificate of title showing it as the lienholder on the vehicle, and where there is no
clearly settled law regarding the priority of competing interests? The standard of review
as to six of the seven factors3 to be considered in awarding punitive damages is clear
error, because those factors are considered to be questions of fact. The seventh factor, the
amount of actual damages awarded, is a mixed question of law and fact, and should be
reviewed for correctness, with some discretion to the trial court as to the underlying facts.
Campbell v. State Farm Ins. Co., 432 Utah Adv. Rep. 44, 2001 (Utah 2001), cert,
granted, 2002 U.S. Lexis 4043.
STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
Utah Code Ann. Section 70A-9-103(2)(d)(Supp. 1998)4 states as follows:
If goods are brought into this state while a security interest therein is
perfected in any matter under the law of the jurisdiction from which the
goods are removed and a certificate of title is issued by this state and the
certificate does not show that the goods are subject to the security interest
or that they may be subject to security interests not shown on the
certificate, the security interest is subordinate to the rights of a buyer of

3

The seven factors, as set forth in Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d
789, 808 (Utah 1991) are: (i) the relative wealth of the defendant; (ii) the nature of the
alleged misconduct; (iii) the facts and circumstances surrounding such conduct; (iv) the
effect thereof of the lives of the plaintiff and others; (v) the probability of future
recurrence of the misconduct; (vi) the relationship of the parties; and (vii) the amount
of actual damages awarded.
4

This statute was repealed by Laws 2000, ch. 252, § 176, effective July 1,
2001. The new statute, not applicable to the transactions at issue herein, is located at
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-316(4)-(5).
9

the goods who is not in the business of selling goods of that kind to the
extent that he gives value and receives delivery of the goods after issuance
of the certificate and without knowledge of the security interest.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

Nature of the Case,

This appeal is from the grant of partial summary judgment against Onyx as to
liability, and judgment awarding compensatory damages against both Defendants in the
total amount of $15,000.89 and punitive damages in the amount of $25,000.00 against
Onyx. Plaintiffs' claims arise out of the repossession of a vehicle which Rick Warner
sold to Mahana, but which had previously been financed by Onyx pursuant to an earlier
sale in the State of California, and in which Onyx had previously perfected a security
interest in California.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

The complaint was filed in this matter on February 12, 1999. On August 10, 1999,
Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, (R.55), requesting summary
adjudication that Onyx was liable to Mahana in conversion. Onyx filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment on August 11, 1999. (R.137). After briefing and oral argument on
the cross-motions for Partial Summary Judgment, on October 27, 1999 the trial court
denied Onyx's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and granted Plaintiffs' Motion,
thereby holding as a matter of law that Defendants was liable to Mahana for conversion.
(R.272).
On November 20, 2002, Onyx filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, or, In The
Alternative, for Partial Summary Judgment, (R.453), requesting summary judgment that:
10

(1) Rick Warner was not legally entitled to take an assignment of Mahana's claims; (2)
Rick Warner was not entitled to statutory protection under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9103(2)(d) as to its interest in the subject vehicle because it was a dealer in goods of the
kind; (3) Mahana's conversion claim against Onyx was personal, and could not be
assigned; (4) if summary judgment was not granted, that Rick Warner could not recover
the fair rental value of substitute vehicles, because such would yield a windfall to Rick
Warner; (5) that Rick Warner was not entitled to recover its attorneys fees from Onyx;
and (6) Mahana was not entitled to recover the replacement value of the vehicle. Prior to
the decision on the Onyx's November 20 Motion, Mahana withdrew his claim for the
replacement value of the vehicle. (R.480-81). After a hearing, the court granted the
Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs' claim for recovery of attorney's fees, and
otherwise denied Onyx's November 20 Motion. (R.514).
Finally, the trial court held a bench trial on April 3rd and 4th, 2001, and thereupon
held that Plaintiffs were entitled to the following compensatory damages:
1.

$1,045.89 to Mahana for lost personal property (i.e., stereo, amplifier and
speakers, sunglasses, and C.D.'s) which the court found to have been in the
vehicle at the time of repossession, but missing when the vehicle was
returned. (R.576-77);

2.

$11,880.00 to Mahana for the lost use of the vehicle from November 16,
1988 to about April 4, 2000, which the court based on the daily rental value
of the substitute vehicles (which Rick Warner provided free of charge to

11

Mahana) of $21.99 per day, multiplied by eighteen months. (R.574-75);
3.

$2,075.00 to Rick Warner for the depreciation incurred on the substitute
vehicles it provided to Mahana while the subject vehicle was out of
Mahana's possession. (R.571-72).

The trial court further held that evidence on punitive damages could be received,
and after a conducting a hearing on punitive damages on April 19, 2001, awarded
punitive damages against Onyx in the amount of $25,000.00. (R.608).
Statement of Facts
On about February 6, 1995, a car dealer named Nissan of Fontana sold a 1994
Mazda pickup to Thomas and Silvia Hartley in the State of California. Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law dated August 9, 2001 ("FOF")f l.5 Onyx financed the purchase.
FOF ^[2. A certificate of title was duly issued by the State of California, properly
showing Onyx as the lienholder. FOF \7. The Hartleys failed to make payments on the
vehicle as agreed, and disappeared soon thereafter, FOF ^[8, 10, presumably taking the
vehicle with them. Onyx made substantial attempts to locate the vehicle and the Hartleys
without success, FOFfflf28, 29, and in about November, 1998 Onyx located the vehicle
in Arizona. FOFffl[29,31.
Before Onyx found the vehicle, on August 24, 1995 a "laundered" certificate of
title had been issued in the State of Arizona, which showed one Sonny Nicholas as the

5

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, entered by the trial court on
August 9, 2001, are located at (R.634-647). Findings of Fact are referred to herein as
"FOF" and Conclusions of Law are referred to as "COL."
12

owner, but did not list Onyx as lienholder. FOF ^J12. On August 29, 1995, another
Arizona title was issued listing Mike Fostino as the owner, again with no lienholder
listed. FOF ^[14. On that same date, title to the vehicle was transferred from Fostino to
Kar King, and then to Chadwick Auto Sales and Leasing ("Chadwick"), two used car
dealers in Arizona. FOF f 15. On September 6, 1995, title to the vehicle was transferred
to Rick Warner, a licensed car dealer in Orem, Utah ("Warner"), who purchased the
vehicle from Chadwick at Southwest Auto Auction in Chandler Arizona. FOF ^[16. Rick
Warner sold the vehicle to Mahana on December 18, 1995, for a total purchase price of
$8,795. FOF f21. Rick Warner did not apply for a Utah certificate of title until after the
sale from Rick Warner to Mahana had occurred. FOF^|22. The Utah certificate was
issued on February 8, 1996, listing Mahana and Oren I. Shephard6 as owners, and Zions
Bank, from whom Mahana had obtained financing for part of the purchase price of the
vehicle, as the lienholder. FOF f23. No Utah certificate of title had been issued prior to
Mahana's purchase of the vehicle. FOFffi[22,23.
After numerous attempts to locate the vehicle, Onyx's skip tracers located the
vehicle in Utah, FOF ^{28-31, and instructed GLS Recovery, Inc. ("GLS") to repossess it,
which GLS did on November 16, 1988. FOF ffl[31-35. At the time of the repossession,
Onyx still had the California certificate of title showing it as lienholder on the subject
vehicle. FOFf7.

6

Shephard was a co-signer on the contract with Mahana, but was not a party to

the suit.
13

On about April 4, 2000 Onyx returned the vehicle to Mahana. FOF ^[61. During
substantially all of the approximately eighteen month period that the vehicle was out of
Mahana's possession, Warner provided Mahana with a series of vehicles to drive, free of
charge to Mahana. All of the vehicles were from Warner's inventor/, and were at least
two model years newer than the subject vehicle. FOF ]f59. The court awarded
$11,880.00 to Mahana as compensatory damages for the lost use of the pickup from
November 16, 1998 to April 2000, based on a finding that the rental value for the
substitute vehicles provided by Warner was $21.99 per day. FOF ]|67.
When the first Arizona certificate of title was issued to Nicholas, a bond in the
amount of $16,275.00 was obtained from Merchants Bonding as a condition of the
issuance of the Arizona title. FOF ^13. Before trial, Merchants Bonding paid $10,789.67
of the bond to Plaintiffs, and $5,395.33 to Onyx. (R.600-601).7 The court held, under the
collateral source rule, that Onyx was not entitled to a credit for the amount paid to
Plaintiffs by Merchants Bonding. COL ^[12; (R.614-15).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Onyx respectfully submits that the trial court erred in the following respects:
First, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Plaintiffs that Onyx
was liable for conversion. At the time the subject vehicle was repossessed from Mahana,
Onyx had a perfected secured interest in the vehicle in California and no Utah certificate

7

The trial court excluded evidence of the bond based on its ruling regarding the
applicability of the collateral source rule, but allowed Onyx to proffer that the amounts
set forth in the text were paid by Merchants Bonding to the parties.
14

of title had been issued. Under the language of Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9~103(2)(d)(Supp.
1998), because Mahana did not purchase the vehicle relying on a "clean" Utah certificate
of title, Mahana is not a bona fide purchaser, and therefore is not entitled to protection
under the statute. Under these circumstances, Onyx's interests prevail over the interests
of Mahana.
Second, assuming arguendo that Onyx should be held liable for conversion, the
trial court's award of damages to Mahana for the lost use of the vehicle was excessive.
Despite the fact that (1) the total value of the vehicle, as determined by the purchase price
paid by Mahana, was $8,795.00; (2) the subject vehicle was returned to Mahana
approximately eighteen months after the repossession; and (3) Mahana had the use of
substitute vehicles, free of charge, for the time that he did not have possession of the
subject vehicle. The trial court's judgment thus awards Mahana approximately 35% more
than the total value of the vehicle for eighteen month's lost use, notwithstanding the fact
that Mahana had the free use of other vehicles during that time.
Third, the trial court erred in holding, under the collateral source rule, that Onyx
was not entitled to credit in the amount of $10,789.67 for bond proceeds that were paid to
Plaintiffs by Merchants Bonding. The collateral source rule does not apply under the
circumstances because the bond was issued for the benefit of any parties, including those
in the position of Onyx herein, who might be damaged because of deficiencies in the
"clear" Arizona certificate of title. Indeed, Onyx shared in a portion of those proceeds.
Because Onyx was equally entitled to the bond proceeds, Onyx is entitled to credit
against any judgment for the amounts paid to Plaintiffs by Merchants Bonding.
15

Fourth, the trial court erred in assessing punitive damages against Onyx because,
as the trial court recognized, there is no settled law on the issue of priority of interest as
between Onyx and Mahana. Because the law is unsettled on this issue, Onyx's position
regarding its rights to the vehicle was asserted in good faith, and Onyx cannot be liable
for punitive damages.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING ONYX LIABLE FOR
CONVERSION AS A MATTER OF LAW, BECAUSE NO UTAH
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE HAD BEEN ISSUED AT THE TIME THE
VEHICLE WAS SOLD BY WARNER TO MAHANA, AND ONYX
THEREFORE HAD A PERFECTED SECURITY INTEREST WHICH
WAS SUPERIOR TO THE INTEREST OF MAHANA.
With regard to conversion, the issue before this Court is straightforward: At the

time Mahana purchased the vehicle from Warner, who had the senior interest-Onyx or
Mahana? Under Utah's enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, Onyx, as a
perfected, secured creditor, maintained its priority interest, notwithstanding the sale to
Mahana.
Utah Code Ann. Section 70A-9-103(2)(d)(Supp. 1998), states as follows:
If goods are brought into this state while a security interest therein is
perfected in any matter under the law of the jurisdiction from which the
goods are removed and a certificate of title is issued by this state and the
certificate does not show that the goods are subject to the security interest
or that they may be subject to security interests not shown on the certificate,
the security interest is subordinate to the rights of a buyer of the goods who
is not in the business of selling goods of that kind to the extent that he gives
value and receives delivery of the goods after issuance of the certificate and
without knowledge of the security interest. (Emphasis added).

16

Rephrasing the statute, the security interest of Onyx is subordinate to the
interest of Mahana only if Mahana:
(1)

was a buyer of the goods who is not in the business of selling
goods of that kind;

(2)

gave value and received delivery after the issuance of the
certificate of title by this state, and that certificate does not
show that the vehicle was subject to Onyx' security interest;
and

(3)

had no knowledge of the security interest.

Onyx agrees that Mahana qualifies under the first and third prongs as set forth
above. However, Mahana fails to satisfy the second prong, and his interest therefore does
not subordinate Onyx's interest as a perfected lienholder.
It is undisputed that Mahana "gave value" and "received delivery" on or about
December 18, 1995, the date he purchased the vehicle from Warner. FOF \2\. It is also
undisputed that on that date, no certificate of title had been issued by "this state" (i.e., in
Utah) since the Utah certificate was not issued until February 8, 1996-some two months
after Mahana gave value and received delivery of the goods. FOF ^|23. Because no
certificate of title had been issued in Utah at the time Mahana purchased the vehicle,
under the clear language of the statute Onyx's previously perfected security interest was
not subordinated to the interest of Mahana.
In Commercial National Bank ofShreveport v. McWilliams, 606 S.W.2d 363 (Ark.
1980), the court reached this conclusion on substantially similar facts. In McWilliams,
Roger Scott ("Scott"), the original purchaser of a motor home, financed part of the
purchase price from Commercial National Bank. The purchase occurred in September,
17

1977, and title was issued in the State of Louisiana showing Mr. Scott as the owner, and
Commercial National Bank as first lienholder. Commercial National Bank had
possession of the certificate of title at all relevant times.
In November, 1977, American Bank and Trust obtained a judgment against Scott.
Pursuant to the judgment, American Bank sold the motor home to French Motors in
February 1978 at a judicial sale, without having obtained or conveyed a certificate of title.
Id. at 364. French Motors then sold the motor home to Barker Auto Sales. In May,
1978, Barker Auto Sales sold the motor home to A.R. Crabtree Motor Company
("Crabtree") who had purchased it for the defendant, McWilliams. A bill of sale was
issued in Arkansas from Crabtree to Mc Williams in May, 1978.
Several months later, in September 1978, the Arkansas Motor Vehicle Division
requested a certificate of title from the State of Louisiana. Commercial National Bank
filed an action for replevin in Arkansas in October 1978. Louisiana issued a certificate of
title in February, 1979, which erroneously failed to list Commercial National Bank's lien.
In March, 1979, Arkansas issued a certificate of title, also reflecting no liens. Id.
The trial court held in favor of McWilliams. On appeal, the Supreme Court of
Arkansas analyzed Ark.Stat.Ann. § 85-9-103(2), which, as cited in McWilliams, is
identical to Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-103(2). The Court noted that McWilliams paid
consideration and took delivery several months before clear titles were issued by
Arkansas or Louisiana, and therefore reversed the trial court and held in favor of the
perfected lienholder. The Court reasoned that "[McWilliams] could not be considered a

18

bona fide purchaser because he did not purchase relying on any certificate of title." Id. at
365 (emphasis added).
Here, as in Mc Williams, the original lender properly perfected its security interest
by having that interest noted on the certificate of title. Both McWilliams and Mahana
gave value and took delivery before a title had been issued by the state where the
purchase occurred. Under the reasoning of McWilliams, because Mahana did not
purchase relying on the Utah certificate of title, Onyx's interest prevails over the interest
of Mahana.
Onyx anticipates that Plaintiffs will argue, as they did below, that Mahana's
interest should prevail because of the issuance of the Arizona certificates of title to
Nicholas and Fostino on August 24, 1995, and on August 29, 1995, respectively. This
issue should also be resolved in Onyx's favor under the language of the statute, which
refers to "goods [which] are brought into this state while a security interest therein is
perfected in any manner under the law of the jurisdiction from which the goods are
removed. . . . " (Emphasis added). Onyx's research has revealed no case law or
commentary defining the term "jurisdiction from which the goods are removed" to clarify
whether the term refers (in the context of this case) to California or Arizona. However,
this portion of the statute refers specifically to the jurisdiction where perfection occurred
(i.e., California in the instant case). The statute should be so construed here, to disallow
the Arizona certificates of title from providing clear title to all subsequent purchasers.8

8

Notably, notwithstanding the issuance of the laundered Arizona certificates of
title, had Onyx located the vehicle while it was in the possession of Rick Warner or the
19

Because Onyx's interest was undoubtedly perfected in California at the time the
vehicle left California, and because Mahana purchased and received delivery of the
vehicle before a Utah certificate of title was issued and, ipso facto, not in reliance on a
clear certificate of title issued in Utah, Mahana, like McWilliams, was not a bona fide
purchaser, and Onyx held the senior interest in the vehicle, notwithstanding the sale to
Mahana.
Onyx therefore respectfully submits that the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment in favor of Mahana on the issue of liability under Mahana's conversion claim,
and request that this Court reverse the trial court's decision, and render a decision that
Onyx has no liability for the repossession of the subject vehicle.

Arizona dealers, Onyx's perfected security interest would clearly have prevailed over
the interest of those dealers because they are "in the business of selling goods of that
kind . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-103(2)(d), and thus are not entitled to the
statutory protection which Mahana is seeking.
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING MAHANA DAMAGES
IN THE AMOUNT OF $11,880.00 FOR CONVERSION OF THE
SUBJECT VEHICLE, BECAUSE THE TOTAL VALUE OF THE
VEHICLE IN QUESTION WAS ONLY $8,795.00, THE VEHICLE WAS
ONLY OUT OF MAHANA'S POSSESSION FOR APPROXIMATELY
EIGHTEEN MONTHS, THE VEHICLE ONLY HAD 10,000 MORE MILES
ON IT WHEN IT WAS RETURNED TO MAHANA THAN AT THE TIME OF
REPOSSESSION, AND MAHANA HAD THE USE OF A SUBSTITUTE
VEHICLE FREE OF CHARGE DURING THE TIME HE DID NOT HAVE
POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT VEHICLE.
Assuming, arguendo, that this Court determines Onyx should be held liable for

conversion, the trial court's award of damages in the amount of $11,880.00 was
excessive, and should be reversed.
It is a well-settled principle of law that the purpose of compensatory damages is, as
the term implies, to compensate a wronged plaintiff for damages suffered. As the court
stated in Lysenko v. Sawaya, 7 P.3d 783, 788 (Utah 2000)(citing Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 903, cmt. a (1979)): "the fundamental purpose of compensatory damages . . . is to
place the plaintiff in the same position as if the tort had not been committed." See, also,
Clayton v. Crossroads Equipment Co., 655 P.2d 1125, 1130 (Utah 1982)(citing Keller v.
Deseret Mortuary Co., 23 Utah 2d 1, 455 P.2d 197 (1979)("a non-breaching party to a
contract should receive an award which will put him in as good a position as he would
have been in had there been no breach")).
It is equally well-settled that a plaintiff may not recover more than the amount
necessary to compensate him for damages suffered.9 See Nelson v. Corp. of the Presiding

9

An exception to this limitation is the collateral source rule, which, as discussed
in Section II below, was improperly applied in this case, thus increasing the windfall
the trial court's decision would provide to Mahana.
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Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 935 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah
1997)(decrying windfall damages which allow a plaintiff to recover more damages than
actually suffered).
Here, the trial court committed error in awarding damages to Mahana in the
amount of $11,880.00 for the lost use of his vehicle.10 The excessiveness of the award is
clearly seen when compared to the vehicle's total purchase price of $8,795.00.n This
disparity, when considered in light of the fact that the vehicle was returned to Mahana by
Onyx approximately eighteen months after the repossession, makes it clear that the trial
court awarded compensatory damages which were excessive.
The court derived the $11,880.00 amount by multiplying the daily cost of renting
vehicles similar to the substitute vehicles provided to Mahana by Rick Warner-$21.99times the eighteen months that Mahana did not have use of the vehicle. (R.574-75). The
application of this figure was in error in two respects: (1) awarding such amount to
Mahana12 was improper because he had the use of the substitute vehicles, free of charge,

10

The award of $11,880.00 was for lost use of the vehicle. Onyx does not
challenge the award of $1,045.89 for the value of the miscellaneous personal effects of
Mahana.
11

Notably, the purchase, and resultant market value, was about eleven months
prior to the repossession.
12

An award of this amount to Rick Warner might have some basis, if Rick
Warner actually incurred the cost of renting a vehicle. However, rather than actually
incur such costs, Rick Warner prudently rotated vehicles from its inventory to Mahana
approximately once a month, FOF f 59, (R.385)(Rick Warner's Response to Second Set
of Interrogatories, establishing that seventeen vehicles were provided to Mahana while
the subject vehicle was out of his possession), thereby minimizing its depreciation
expense. The trial court found that Rick Warner was entitled to damages in the amount
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during the whole eighteen month period; and (2) the amount assessed against Onyx far
exceeds the total value of the vehicle.
The trial court therefore erred in assessing compensatory damages in the amount of
$11,880.00 for Mahana's lost use of the vehicle, and, if the court determines not to render
a decision in Onyx's favor as to liability as argued in Section I above, Onyx requests that
the matter be remanded for new trial as to a proper and just award of damages.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INVOKING THE COLLATERAL SOURCE
RULE IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS DID NOT PAY
FOR THE BENEFITS FOR WHICH THEY NOW CLAIM SOLE RIGHT, AND
BECAUSE ONYX HAS RIGHTS EQUAL TO THOSE OF
PLAINTIFFS IN THE FUNDS RECEIVED FROM MERCHANTS BONDING
COMPANY.
As set forth in the Statement of Facts above, when the first Arizona certificate of

title was issued to Nicholas, a bond in the amount of $16,275.00 was obtained from
Merchants Bonding Company ("Merchants Bonding") as a condition of the issuance of
the Arizona title. FOF fl3. Before trial, Merchants Bonding paid $10,789.67 of the bond
amount to Plaintiffs and $5,395.33 to Onyx. The trial court held, pursuant to the
collateral source rule, that Onyx was not entitled to credit for the amounts paid to
Plaintiffs by Merchants Bonding. Onyx submits that the collateral source rule was
improperly applied by the trial court under the circumstances.
The collateral source rule "provid[es] that a wrongdoer is not entitled to have
damages, for which he is liable, reduced by proof that the plaintiff has received or will

of $2,075.00 for such depreciation expense, (R.571-72), which is adequate
compensation to Rick Warner, and which amount Onyx does not dispute.
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receive compensation or indemnity for the loss from an independent collateral source."
DuBois v. Nye, 584 P.2d 823, 825 (Utah 1978). The collateral source rule is most often
invoked where a personal injury plaintiff receives medical insurance payments for his
injuries. Phillips v. Bennett, 430 P.2d 457, 458 (Utah 1968). For exeimple, in Phillips, a
case involving a lawsuit to recover for personal injuries by a plaintiff who had previously
received payment from a medical expense insurance policy, the court held that where
such payment had been "pursuant to a[n insurance] policy, the premium of which was not
paid not contributed by the defendant, the payments so received belong to the plaintiff
and are not to be credited to the defendant." Id. The rationale behind the rule under such
circumstances is sound where a plaintiff is compensated by insurance for which the
plaintiff paid the premium, thereby allocating the right of recovery to the party who paid
for it. See also DuBois, supra, 584 P.2d 823 (Utah 1978)(plaintiff s insurer, which paid
proceeds under homeowner's policy, was entitled to invoke collateral source rule in
subrogation action against the alleged tortfeasor defendants).
Here, in contrast, it is clear that neither plaintiff paid the bond premium to
Merchants Bonding, who issued the bond in August, 1995, several months before the
vehicle was sold from Rick Warner to Mahana. Thus, one underlying purpose of the
collateral source rule-to allow the party who paid for such insurance coverage to receive
the benefit of the proceeds-does not appear in the instant case. The parties hereto, all of
whom have clearly been damaged by the intentional wrongs of the third party who
laundered the title in Arizona, thus stand on equal footing with regard to their rights to
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bond proceeds. There is no reason that Plaintiffs should get the unilateral benefit of the
bond funds which application of the collateral source rule would provide them.
Indeed, it is clear under Utah law that the collateral source rule is not without
limitation. In Gibbs M. Smith, Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity, 949 P.2d 337, 345 (Utah 1997), Gibbs
M. Smith, Inc. ("Gibbs") had entered into a contractual arrangement with Tom Heinz
("Heinz") to publish a book written by Heinz, and to use certain photographs owned by
Heinz in the publication. Gibbs contracted the publishing to a Regent Printing
("Regent"), which subcontracted the processing of the photographs to another company
located in Malaysia. After performing its work on the photographs, the Malaysia
company shipped the photographs and transparencies to Regent. However, they were
never received back by Regent, and were never located. In all, fifteen photographs
valued at $ 1500.00 each, were lost. Regent paid $3000.00 to Gibbs in partial
compensation for the loss.
Gibbs sued its carrier, United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. ("USF&G"), for
the loss. USF&G denied the claim, asserting that the loss was not covered. After
deciding the merits of the coverage dispute in favor of Gibbs, this Court analyzed Gibbs'
claim that USF&G was not entitled to offset the damages award by the $3,000.00 that
Regent had previously paid to Gibbs.
In considering whether to apply the collateral source rule, this Court stated that if
Heinz had received the payment from his own independent insurer, the collateral source
rule would apply, and USF&G would not be entitled to the offset. However, this Court
determined that where Gibbs was the claimant, and Gibbs itself "could factually be
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considered a wrongdoer . . . and the party who stands to benefit is the insurer, who is not
a wrongdoer . . . " the collateral source rule does not apply. Gibbs was therefore not
entitled to claim the collateral source rule, and USF&G was entitled to credit the amount
of Regent's payment to Gibbs against the amount of the judgment. Id.
Under the reasoning of Gibbs, the collateral source rule does not apply in the
instant case. Here, the payments at issue, although not coming directly from the
wrongdoer (i.e. the original purchaser or his assignee/purchaser who improperly
laundered the vehicle's title in Arizona), were made as a direct result of that wrongdoer's
action. In relation to the innocent parties before the Court,13 Merchants Bonding, as bond
issuer for the culpable party, essentially stands in the shoes of that wrongdoer. It follows
that Plaintiffs are no more entitled to the benefit paid by Merchants Bonding than is
Onyx.
The impropriety of the trial court's application of the collateral source rule in favor
of Plaintiffs is illustrated by consideration of two slight variations on the current facts.
First, consider the result if, rather than pay a portion of the bond funds directly to
Plaintiffs, Merchants Bonding had interpled the funds into court. Assume that at the close
of trial the court determined that Plaintiffs had suffered joint damages of $10,000.00. The
funds from Merchants Bonding, being then in the possession of the Court, would properly
be applied to pay those damages, which, after all, is the purpose of bond. There is no

13

If the parties had been able to locate the true wrongdoer in this case (i.e., the
person who laundered the certificate of title in Arizona), and subject him to the
jurisdiction of the Court, he would undoubtedly have ultimate liability for the damages
suffered by all parties in this case.
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reason that the fact that some of the bond funds were paid to Plaintiffs prior to trial should
alter that net result.
Second, consider the result if, after locating the vehicle, Onyx determined not to
repossess it, but instead thereafter filed a claim with Merchants Bonding to cover the
damages it suffered because of the laundered title. Based on its obligation under the
bond, Merchants Bonding would have compensated Onyx for the amount of its damages,
up to the bond limit of $16,275.00, and Plaintiffs, having suffered no damages under this
hypothetical, would have had no claim thereto. Just as there is no reason under this
hypothetical to allow the Plaintiffs to recover any amount of the bond, there is no reason
under the facts before the Court that Plaintiffs should be allowed to retain, without
appropriate credit being given to Onyx, the amount they have received to date under the
bond. To do so would allow the Plaintiffs to reap an impermissible windfall.
Onyx therefore requests that, in the event the court determines not to reverse and
render on the issue of liability for conversion as argued in Section I above, that the Court
remand to the trial court, with instructions to order that Onyx be given credit in the
amount of $10,789.67 against any judgment that may be entered against Onyx.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ASSESSING PUNITIVE DAMAGES
AGAINST ONYX WHERE, AT THE TIME IT ORDERED THE
REPOSSESSION, ONYX HELD A CERTIFICATE OF TITLE FOR THE
SUBJECT VEHICLE SHOWING THAT IT HAD A PERFECTED SECURITY
INTEREST THEREIN, AND THERE IS NO SETTLED LAW TO
DETERMINE WHO, AS BETWEEN ONYX AND MAHANA, HAD A
PRIORITY INTEREST IN THE VEHICLE.
When Plaintiffs argued their right to recover punitive damages, their counsel

criticized Onyx for ordering the repossession. "Now, either Onyx is unaware of the of the
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[sic] UCC Provision Article 99 [sic]; Section 102, or it knows, or should know but just
doesn't care. That would be the attitude that seems to emerge in this trial." In response,
the trial court recognized that there has been no clear pronouncement of the law on this
issue, stating:
Well, most of the solutions were not crystal clear. It wasn't easy for me to
discern, and I am not confident that the Supreme Court will give it a good
thought when they face it again, and doesn't that factor in? I mean, this is a
complicated scenario. And it isn't plainly and clearly answered by a statute,
even though I deduced a legislative intent, boy, that conclusion doesn't
leave that [sic]14 from the language of the statute, does it? (Emphasis
added).
(R.697)(Transcript of April 4, 2001 Hearing at 43-44)(emphasis added).
The trial court thus recognized (but thereafter ignored) the tenet that, where there
is an unsettled question of law, it is improper to assess punitive damages. This Court has
recognized this point in the context of cases dealing with the breach of duty of good faith
and fair dealing in the denial of an insurance claim. E.g., Prince v. Bear River Mutual
Ins. Co., _ P . 3 d _ , 2002 UT 68 (Sept. 12, 2002), S. W. Energy Corp. v. Continental
Insurance Co., 91A P.2d 1239 (Utah 1999). As the court recognized in S. W. Energy
Corp.: "[w]hen an insured's claim is fairly debatable, the insurer is entitled to debate it
and cannot be held to have breached the implied covenant [of good faith] if it chooses to

14

Counsel believes that the court actually stated "leap out" rather than "leave

that."
28

do so."15 974 P.2d at 1243 (citing Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461 (Utah
1996)).
The rule was perhaps most forcefully stated in Travelers Indemnity Co. v.
Armstrong, 442 N.E.2d 349, 358 (Ind. 1982), in which the court stated that, where the
issue underlying the imposition of punitive damages is one of law, not of fact, and the
law is unsettled in the controlling jurisdiction, "it is . . . difficult to imagine circumstances
more repugnant to an award of punitive damages."
While the insurance cases analyzing potential liability for bad faith denial of a
claim are perhaps not directly on point with this non-insurance case, the reasoning applies
with equal force. Given that the imposition of punitive damages requires that the actions
of the tortfeasor be "the result of willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent
conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a
disregard of, the rights of others," Utah Code Ann. § 78-18- 1(a), where, as appears in the
instant case, there is no clear pronouncement as to what a particular party's rights are

15

The dismissal of a claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing
where there was a reasonable basis for denying or disputing the claim is widely
recognized in numerous jurisdictions. E.g., Lunsfordv. Am. Guar. &Liab. Ins. Co., 18
F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 1994)(summary judgment against insured's claim for punitive damages
proper where insurer bases its actions on reasonable construction of insurance policy),
Downer v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 337 S.E.2d 422 424 (Ga.App.
1985)(improper to assess bad faith penalties and damages against an insurer where there
are reasonable grounds to contest or deny claims pending decision by court of controlling
jurisdiction on dispositive legal issue), Frickey v. Equity Mutual Insurance Co., 576 P.2d
702 (Kan. App. 1978)(where issue of insurance coverage under circumstances not settled,
punitive damages for bad faith denial of benefits not allowed).
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under the law, it necessarily follows that the other party cannot act in reckless disregard,
or with willful or malicious intent with regard to those rights.
Here, as the trial court properly recognized, there is no clearly established case law
to assist with interpretation of the relevant statute, and the correct application of the
statute to the instant facts is unclear.16 Indeed, as the trial court stated, "I am not
confident that the Supreme Court will give it a good thought when they face it again .. ."
(R.697)(Transcript of April 4, 2001 Hearing at 43-44). Given the unsettled state of the
law with regard to Onyx's rights vis-a-vis the rights of Mahana, to punish Onyx for
repossessing the subject vehicle would, in the language of Traveler's Indemnity, be
repugnant, and violative of Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1(a).
Onyx requests that this Court reverse the trial court's assessment of punitive
damages, and render a decision thereon in their favor.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this Court should reverse the trial court's judgment
holding Onyx liable for conversion and liable for punitive damages, and render judgment
in favor of Onyx. In the event the Court determines not to reverse and render, Onyx
requests that the Court reverse the trial court's decision regarding the amount of

16

Not only is there a paucity of Utah law, Onyx's research on other states'
enactments of Uniform Commercial Code 9-103(2)(d) has revealed no case law, and
Plaintiffs cited none to the court below, to determine the priority of interest where
collateral is moved from the original state in which a lender has a perfected security
interest, to a second state where a laundered certificate of title is issued, and then to a
third state where no new certificate of title is issued before sale to a non-merchant
purchaser.
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compensatory damages awarded to Mahana for lost use of the subject vehicle, remand for
a new trial on that issue, reverse the trials courts' decision regarding the collateral source
rule and direct that the trial court order that Onyx be given credit against any judgment
rendered after a new trial in the amount of $10,789.67, for the funds paid to Plaintiffs by
Merchants Bonding.

,

DATED this [£_ day of November, 2002.

Curtis R. Hussey
Counsel for Defendants/Appellants
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this / / - d a y of November, 2002,1 caused to be
served two true and correct copies of the foregoing document by depositing the same in
the United States mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to the following:
P. Bryan Fishburn
Fishburn & Associates
4505 South Wasatch Blvd., #215
Salt Lake City, UT 84124
Facsimile (801) 277-0333
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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
70A-9-103
(2)(d)

If goods are brought into this state while a

security interest therein is perfected in any manner under
the law of the jurisdiction from which the goods are
removed and a certificate of title is issued by this state
and the certificate does not show that the goods are
subject to the security interest or that they may be
subject to security interests not shown on the certificate,
the security interest is subordinate to the rights of a
buyer of the goods who is not in the business of selling
goods of that kind to the extent that he gives value and
receives delivery of the goods after issuance of the
certificate and without knowledge of the security
interest.
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ADDENDUM, #2

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Chris S. Mahana and Rick Warner Toyota,
Plaintiffs

:

Memorandum Decision

vs.

:

Date: September 23, 1999

Onyx Acceptance Corporation and
GLS Recovery, Inc.,

:

Case Number: 990400472

:

Division V: Judge James R. Taylor

Defendants

This matter comes before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment. The facts
are not in dispute.
Facts
On March 26, 1995 the State of California issued a certificate of title for a 1994 pickup
truck to Thomas Hartley that showed Onyx Acceptance Corporation (Onyx) as a lien holder. A
few months later, on August 24, 1995, the State of Arizona issued a certificate of title to the same
truck to Sonny Nicholas showing no lienholders. Although it is not known how the truck got to
Arizona or who actually sold or gave the truck to Sonny Nicholas, it is clear that at least as of
August 24, 1995 the truck was in Arizona and a clean title was issued by that State. Five days
later, on August 29, 1995 a new Arizona title was issued to Mike Fostino. On the same day,
Fostino transferred the title to KarKing, an auto dealership. KarKing transferred the title to
Chadwick Auto, also an auto dealership. About a week later, on September 6, 1995, Rick
Warner Toyota purchased the truck and received a "signed off'Arizona title. The truck was
Page 1 of
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brought to Utah at that time and on December 8, 1995, was sold to the Plaintiff, Mr. Mahana
(Mahana).
On February 8, 1996 the State of Utah issued a new certificate of title, relying upon the
signed off, clean Arizona title, in favor of Mahana with a lien for Mahana5 s lender, Zions First
National Bank.
Two and one half years later Onyx located and repossessed the truck, relying upon the
California title which it had never relinquished.
Analysis
Mahana brings this suit seeking damages for wrongful conversion of the truck and items of
personal property he had in the truck. This motion addresses only the issue of the legality of the
taking of the truck.
The parties agree that disposition of this motion is governed by the language of section
70A-9-103(2)(b) and/or (d). The parties disagree as to how the sections should be interpreted.
Subsection (b) provides that when collateral is moved into a new jurisdiction, the
perfection of the security interest in the home state continues until any new state ("another
jurisdiction") issues a title (the goods are "registered") and four months have passed. After that
time the security interest registered in the original state is extinguished unless renewed in the new
state, Arrow Ford, Inc.v. Western Landscape Construction Co.. Inc., 23 Ariz. App. 281, 532 P.2d
553 at 555 (1975). If this section, alone, is considered in this case then Mahana wins because a
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new certificate of title was issued in Arizona and more than four months have passed without any
renewal of the security interest in either Arizona or Utah.
Onyx, however, cites the provisions of subsection (d) for protection of it's interest. That
subsection provides that:
If goods are brought into this state while a security interest therein is perfected in
any manner under the law of the jurisdiction from which the goods are removed
and a certificate of title is issued by this state and the certificate does not show that
the goods are subject to the security interest or that they may be subject to security
interests not shown on the certificate, the security interest is subordinate to the
rights of a buyer of the goods who is not in the business of selling goods of that
kind to the extent that he gives value and receives delivery of the goods after
issuance of the certificate and without knowledge of the security interest
(Emphasis added).
Onyx argues that the truck was brought to Utah within the four month period under
subsection (b) and that the California lien was, therefore, still valid when Mahana actually took
possession. All parties agree that Mahana is "a buyer of the goods who is not in the business of
selling goods of that kind" and had no knowledge of the security interest of Onyx. Onyx,
however, insists that the plain language of the statute requires that he give value and take delivery
after issuance of a clean Utah certificate to receive protection from the California lien. Onyx
argues, essentially, that the "jurisdiction from which the goods are removed" refers to California.
Counsel for Onyx concedes that, once four months had passed, a second purchaser in Arizona
(after Sonny Nicholas) would have taken clear of the Onyx interest. Moreover, counsel for Onyx
concedes that had Mahana sold the truck to another non-dealer purchaser in Utah more than four
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months after August 24, 1995, who then received a second Utah title, Onyx would have lost its
interest.
This Court is of the view that the interpretation proposed by Onyx unreasonably extends
the period for re-perfection and was not intended by the drafters of the code. The code was
intended to provide a system whereby liens and security interests could be made "of record" to
facilitate the free exchange of goods with confidence as to the status of the title of those goods.
The security interest that was extinguished by the clean title in Arizona, coupled with the passage
of four months was not revived simply because the next purchaser in line happened to be one
more state removed. The language of subsection (d) "under the law of the jurisdiction from
which the goods are removed" can only reasonably be taken to mean the most immediate
removal-in this case from Arizona to Utah. There are three non-dealer bona fide purchasers for
value in the chain of title of this truck. By the time of the repossession, under the Onyx view of
the statute, the first two could have claimed priority but not the third. That is not a sensible or
reasonable result and not consistent with what this Court perceives to be the purpose of the
system established by the code. Once the four month period has run with a clean title issued and
no re-perfection has occurred, all the world is entitled to rely on the clean title.
Onyx had no perfected interest in the State of Arizona, and therefore subsection (d) does
not apply. Summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff is granted as prayed. Counsel for the
Plaintiff is directed to prepare appropriate findings and an order. The parties are encouraged to
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seek mediation as to the remaining issues. The Court will wait until November 1, 1999 to allow
the parties to resolve the remaining issues by negotiation or mediation. After that date the Court
Clerk/Bailiff will contact the parties for further appropriate scheduling
Dated this 23rd day of September, 1999

Judge James R Taylor
Fourth Judicial District Court
Copies of this Order mailed to:
Counsel for the Plaintiff:
P. Bryan Fishburn
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH
10 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Counsel for the Defendant:
Evan A. Schmutz
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ
Jamestown Square Suite 200
3319 North University Avenue
Provo,
ovo, Utah 8460^
84604.
Mailed thi gffrday

of M41

, 1999, postage pre-paid as noted above
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Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH
P. BRYAN FISHBURN, ESQ. (#A4572)
Gateway Tower East, Suite #900
10 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 530-7300
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Chris S. Mahana and Rick Warner Toyota

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CHRIS S. MAHANA and RICK
WARNER TOYOTA,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER RULING ON PARTIES'
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.
Civil No. 990400472
ONYX ACCEPTANCE
CORPORATION and GLS
RECOVERY, INC.,

Judge James R. Taylor

Defendants.

BEFORE THE COURT are cross-motions for summary or partial summary
judgment. Plaintiff Chris Mahana's motion for partial summary judgment asks the
Court to determine that Defendants are liable to him for conversion, for their taking
from him in November 1998, a 1994 Mazda pickup that he owned. Defendants1
motion for summary judgment asks the Court to determine that they had the authority

and legal right to take and repossess Mahana's pickup based on the notation of Onyx
Acceptance Corporation1 s lien on a prior unsurrendered California Certificate of Title
and that they, therefore, are not liable in conversion.
The Court has read and considered the argument of the parties, as set forth in
their memoranda and in oral argument presented to the Court on September 23, 1999.
Mahana was represented on oral argument by P. Bryan Fishburn, Esq. Defendants
were represented by Evan A. Schmutz, Esq. The memoranda filed by the parties
establish, and counsel confirmed, that the material facts underlying the motions are not
in dispute.
Good cause appearing, for the reasons stated by the Court on the record and in
its Memorandum Decision dated September 23, 1999, THE COURT ORDERS,
ADJUDGES AND DECREES, as follows:
1.

The Court grants Plaintiff Chris Mahana's Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment.
2.

The Court denies Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

DATED this

ff7

day of

C ^ ^ >

, 1999.

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

By:
Evan A. Schmutz, Esq.
Curt R. Hussey, Esq.

pbf\264628-l
October 7, 1999
2:40 PM

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the following [proposed]
ORDER RULING ON PARTIES1 MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was
mailed, postage prepaid, on this

& —

day of October, 1999, to the

following:

Evan A. Schmutz, Esq.
Curt R. Hussey, Esq.
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, P.C.
Jamestown Square, Suite #200
3319 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604

I^^^^^Ji—

pbf\264628-l
October 7, 1999
2:40 PM
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FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, Stateof Utah
' ^
, > w

7'^/

Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Chris S. Mahana and Rick Warner
Toyota,
Plaintiffs

:

vs.

:

Date: April 9,2001

Onyx Acceptance Corporation
and GLS Recovery, Inc.,

:

Case Number: 990400472

:

Division V: Judge James R. Taylor

Defendants

Memorandum Decision

This matter came before the Court on the 3rd and 4th days of April, 2001 for trial. The
Court has earlier considered cross motions for summary judgment and rendered a Memorandum
Decision on September 23, 1999. In that decision the Court determined, as a matter of law, that
the November 13, 1998 repossession of the truck in the possession of Plaintiff Chris S. Mahana
by GLS Recovery, acting as agent for Onyx Acceptance Corporation, was a wrongful conversion
of the truck and items of personal property that Mr. Mahana may have had in the truck. All
remaining issues in this case were reserved for trial. Plaintiff Chris Mahana is seeking punitive
damagesfromDefendant Onyx Acceptance Corporation. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
section 78-18-1(2) the Court has not received evidence of any party's wealth or financial
condition.
Damages to Chris S. Mahana
The desired objective in computing damages and fashioning a remedy is to evaluate a loss
suffered by the most direct and practical method that can be employed, Even Odds, Inc. v.
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NielsoiL 22 Utah 2nd 49, 448 P.2d 709 (1968) as cited in Clayton v. Crossroads Equipment
Company, 655 P.2d 1125 (Utah, 1982). "The measure of damages in a conversion action is the
value of the property at the time of the conversion, plus interest, . . . However, rules relating to
the measure of damages are flexible, and 'can be modified in the interest of fairness'. . . (Citations
omitted) . . . . The damages in an action for conversion are measured by the sum of money
necessary to compensate the plaintiff for all actual losses or injuries sustained as a natural and
proximate result of the defendant's wrong," Henderson v. For-Shor Company. 757 P.2d 465
(Utah App., 1988). Moreover, "a wrongdoer is not entitled to have damages, for which he is
liable, reduced by proof that the plaintiff has received or will receive compensation or indemnity
for the loss from an independent collateral source," GibbsM. Smith. Inc. v. U.S.F.& G.. 949 P.2d
337 (Utah, 1997) and DuBoisv.Nve. 584 P.2d 823 (Utah, 1978).
In this case the Court has already determined that the 1994 Mazda pickup truck purchased
by Chris S. MahanafromRick Warner Toyota together with personal property that may have
been inside the truck were wrongfully converted. The Court finds, to a preponderance of the
evidence, that the truck, when it was taken had a working stereo, amplifier and speakers which
had been purchased by Mr. Mahana at a total cost of $795.89. Although these items had been
purchased several years before the repossession, there was no evidence that they were damaged
or had otherwise depreciated since the time of purchase. The Court will not speculate as to lost
value from the passage of time for these items. The Court also finds, to a preponderance of the
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evidence, that a case containing approximately 12 used CD's of unknown title and sunglasses
belonging to Mr. Mahana were in the truck at the time of repossession. To make explicit what
should be implicit from this conclusion, the Court has considered and compared the testimony of
AlvinLosee and the testimony of Mr. Mahana on this point and concludes that the testimony of
Mr. Losee is less credible. The evidence as to the value of the missing CD's consisted of a
description of Mr. Mahana's efforts to replace them for hisfriendby purchasing 10 or 11 CD's
over a period of time for around $10.00 each. The Courtfinds,based upon that testimony, that
the value of the CD's taken was $100.00. The sunglasses had been purchased by Mr. Mahana for
$150.00.
After this Court's Memorandum Decision on September 23, 1999, the Defendant Onyx
Acceptance Corporation (hereinafter "Onyx") located and returned the 1994 Mazda truck to Mr.
Mahana. When the truck was recovered in April, 2000, the stereo in the dash was damaged and
unuseable. The amplifier and speakers behind the front seat were gone. The CD's and sunglasses
were also missing. No other damage to the truck was noted although 10,000 additional miles had
been placed upon the vehicle.
There was no credible evidence regarding market value of the truck at the time of the
conversion and, indeed, use of the market value of converted property to determine damages is
only appropriate when the property is not returned, Henderson, supra. However, this Court will
endeavor to fairly evaluate the loss suffered by Mr. Mahana, without deducting for the collateral
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benefit provided by Rick Warner Toyota since this Court concludes that the collateral source rule
does apply to the efforts of that company.
Personal property having a total value of $1045.89 is gone. Mr. Mahana should be paid
that amount together with interest at the pre-judgment ratefromNovember 13, 1998 to payment.
Rental cost for a late model small size pickup truck in 1998 would have been $45.00 per
day or $1,200.00 per month at a wholesale rate. Mr. Mahana was without his truck for 18
months. Calculated at that rate, damages would be $21,600.00. The Court is well aware that Mr.
Mahana paid less than $9,000.00 for the truck in December of 1995. The quoted rate was for
rentalfromEnterprise Rent-a-Car which is the largest car rental company in North America. The
entire Enterprise fleet, however, is comprised of vehicles less than two years old. At the time of
the taking this truck was over three years old. An award of the total retail rental cost for a
relatively new truck would, in the view of this Court, create an inequitable windfall for the
Plaintiff.
The general rule is that in an action for the conversion of
personal property the plaintiff may recover the fair, reasonable,
market value thereof... . Damages are not to be based on
replacement value.
Where the market value fails to furnish the true measure of
damages for the conversion of a chattel, the actual damages may be
shown by appropriate evidence. . .. Where no market value exists,
the damages must be determined in view of all the circumstances
bearing on the question. Am.Jur.2d Conversion, section 105.
Use of interest on the value of the truck might also be considered as a measure of damages
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to be considered in lieu of the rental value of the lost asset, 18 Am.Jur.2d. Conversion section 121
(1985). As noted above, no evidence of the value of the truck at the time of the conversion was
presented to the Court. Exhibit 25, however, is an exact record of payments made during the
relevant time to Zion's Bank on the loan used to purchase the truck. The exhibit shows that from
November, 1998 through March, 2000, 18 payments were made including $799.06 that was
applied to interest. Mr. Mahana paid $1,000.00 cash as a down payment for the truck in 1995
and had made regular payments on afiveyear loan since that time. There isn't a necessary
connection between the unpaid balance of the loan and the value of the truck, particularly where,
as occurred in this case, several additional charges to the loan were made for insurance.
There was also testimony presented that, whatever the market value of the truck may have
been, the truck depreciated in value during the 18 month period of absence by somewhere
between $1,500 and $3,000. The $1,500figurewas supplied by an expert who deals in wholesale
vehicles and the $3,000 camefroma retail sales manager. It is clear that the truck would have
depreciated by the same amount whether it had been taken or not since the loss in value in either
case was attributed to the passage of time.
Mr. Mahana was provided, by Co-PlaintifF Rick Warner Toyota, a succession of cars for
use, without charge. RentalfromEnterprise Rent-A-Car of cars of similar make and model to the
cars provided would have cost $21.99 per day in 1998. Those cars would have been newer than
the truck taken. Nevertheless, that rate calculated at 18 months would yield a total of
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$11,880.00.
Although Mr. Mahana testified that the value of each of the cars provided was about the
same as his truck and that he was satisfied with the arrangement, he couldn't tow jet skis, haul
items for personal use or go camping with the cars. There was a sentimental value to Mr. Mahana
from having a pickup truck as opposed to a car. Frankly the Court is cognizant that this 19 year
old single male went from a pickup truck with equipped with a CD player, amplifier and additional
speakers to a Dodge Neon. The ride, for him, was just not the same.
Weighing all of these circumstances the Court concludes that a fair measure of damages
for the deprivation of the pickup truckfromMr. Mahana for 18 months is $11,880.00. The total
loss to Mr. Mahana would consist of the $11,880.00 plus interestfromthe date the vehicle was
returned plus $1045.89 together with interest on that totalfromNovember 13, 1998 to date of
payment.
Rick Warner Toyota
Rick Warner Toyota has joined in this action and seeks recovery, not from any assignment
of Mr. Mahana's cause of action, but from a common law claim of indemnity and wrongful
repossession. The three elements of implied indemnity are explained in Salt Lake City School
Dist. v. Galbraith & Green. Inc.. 740 P.2d 284 at 287 (Utah App., 1987). The Defendants have
conceded that of the three elements of implied indemnity, two have been met by the facts of this
case. Rick Warner Toyota had a legal obligation to Mr. Mahana under a theory of warranty of
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title and, as this Court has already determined, Onyx owes a duty to Mr. Mahana because of the
wrongful repossession. The third element requires a comparison of the respective positions of
Rick Warner Toyota and Onyx as to the loss of Mr. Mahana to determine which should extinguish
that loss, Salt Lake City School Dist. supra at 290.
The Court finds, to a preponderance, that Rick Warner Toyota purchased the truck in the
normal course of business as it has many times before and since and reasonably relied upon a clear
Arizona title in warranting title to Mr. Mahana. While they certainly could have run a nationwide
title search before selling the truck, there was absolutely no evidence or reason presented to them
to do so. The Arizona title was clean on its face and they had purchased under normal
circumstances from a reputable source.
Onyx, on the other hand, had several clear indications that there may have been problems
with their repossession. Long before the repossession they had tracked the vehicle to Arizona and
provided an agent in that state with an address for thefirstperson on the Arizona chain of title,
Mr. Faustino (exhibits 8, 41A and 14 at page 62). The Faustino name and the address on the
Arizona title were made available by Onyx to the Tucson Recovery Bureau (TRB) in an attempt
to locate the truck in Arizona before the Utah Repossession (exhibit 62 A and 62B). Onyx,
without any discernible justification beyond their own general suspicion of creditors in default,
assumed that their borrower, Mr. Hartley and Mr. Faustino were the same person. Soon after the
truck was not located by TRB, Onyx utilized a company out of Alabama called Renegade
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Research & Investigation Services (Renegade) who managed to locate the truck registered in
Utah with tag connected to "Chris Mehana or Oren Shepard" (exhibit 16). Based upon that
information Co-Defendant GLS was retained to physically repossess the truck. In spite of the
Onyx conclusion that Hartley, Faustino and Mahana were all the same person, GLS was told the
truck would or could be in the possession of a "third party," Chris Mahana.
Onyx had substantial reason to doubt the priority and status of its lien and a clear
opportunity to examine the status of the Utah title before undertaking the repossession which has
been determined by this Court to have been a wrongful conversion. The Rick Warner Toyota
obligation arose only because of the conduct of Onyx. The Court concludes that the
responsibility to pay equitably rests with Onyx.
The reasonable measure of damages for this separate cause of action is an amount
necessary to place Rick Warner Toyota in a position comparable to where it would have been but
for the wrong. The evidence on this point was in substantial dispute. Had the cars provided by
Rick Warner been rented for that purpose the cost would have been substantially more than the
actual loss suffered. There was no substantial evidence that the cars, which were takenfromthe
rotating used car inventory, were sold for less than they would have had they not been loaned to
Mr. Mahana. There was certainly a cost since the sale of the cars purchased for the specific
purpose of re-sale was delayed. The most credible evidence of the cost to Rick Warner Toyota
was provided by the depreciation study conducted by Bruce Reese. The Court concludes that the
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depreciation loss totaling $2,075 for the vehicles loaned to Mr. Mahana is an appropriate measure
of the amount necessary to compensate Rick Warner Toyota.
Punitive Damages
Plaintiff Chris Mahana has also asked this Court to consider an award of punitive damages
against Defendant Onyx. Utah Code Annotated section 78-18-1 codifies the elements of a
punitive damages claim. Compensatory damages have been awarded as noted above. The issue
presented by this trial is whether the evidence has established, by clear and convincing evidence,
that Onyx engaged in conduct that manifested a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a
disregard of, the rights of others.
As noted above, there were clear indications given to Onyx before the repossession that
there was at least a legitimate question about the status of the title and the Onyx lien priority.
Shortly after the repossession both GLS and Onyx had direct contact from the Mahana family, a
managerfromRick Warner Toyota and Zion's Bank who all independently asserted that Chris
Mahana had a legitimate claim to the truck and that the repossession was wrongful. The Onyx
agent noted, on August 13, 1998, that he "didn't understand how a car purchased in California
could have been insured in Arizona." On November 16, immediately following the repossession,
the agent took a callfromZions Bank who claimed to have a valid lien on a Utah title at 3:46
p.m. (Exhibit 14 at page 50). Within 10 minutes the agent reviewed the matter with a supervisor
and was told to move the unit immediately out of state for resale. On that same day a transport
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request directing the truck to be given to a transporter identified by the title "No Procrastination"
was sent by facsimile transmission to GLS. After the truck was transported to Las Vegas a
standard notice of intent to sell the repossessed property was mailed. In spite of all the
information provided to Onyx about addresses and possible owners or claimants, the notice was
sent only to a last known address in California for the original California debtor Hartley. Storage
cost at GLS in Orem, had Onyx chosen to make an attempt to investigate the claim of Mr.
Mahana would have been $8.00 per day. The only reason offered by Onyx for the quick
transportation of the vehicle out of state was to protect Onyxfromthose storage costs.
The evidence is clear and convincing that Onyx engaged in conduct that demonstrated a
knowing and reckless indifference toward and a disregard of the rights of Mr. Mahana, Rick
Warner Toyota and Zion's Bank. They knew of the possibility of a claim before the repossession
which they made no effort to investigate. They were directly told from three separate sources of
the claim immediately after the repossession and they responded by moving the vehicle out of
state and re-selling without notice to any of the claimants and without making any attempt to
investigate or determine the validity of the claims.
What remains in this case is for the Court to hear further evidence regarding the wealth or
financial condition of the relevant parties and a determination of proper punitive damages
pursuant to Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange. 860 P.2d 937 (Utah, 1993). Counsel are
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directed to contact the Court to schedule an appropriate hearing date to receive relevant evidence.
Dated this 9th day of April, 2001

Copies of this Order mailed to:

0/

^t^^/^

Counsel for the Plaintiff:
P. Bryan Fishburn
Michael D. Misner
4505 South Wasatch Boulevard, Suite #215
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Counsel for the Defendant:
Evan A. Schmutz
Curtis R. Hussey
3319 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604
Mailed this ?

day o f 6 j 4 ^ A , 2001, postage pre-paid as noted above.
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FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

___j^£/0L.^Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Chris S. Mahana and Rick Warner
Toyota,
Plaintiffs
vs.
Onyx Acceptance Corporation
and GLS Recovery, Inc.,
Defendants

Memorandum Decision
On Punitive Damages
Date: June 20, 2001
Case Number: 990400472
Division V: Judge James R. Taylor

This matter came before the Court on the 14th day of June for the receipt of evidence and
argument related to punitive damages. On the 23rd of September, 1999, this Court ruled that the
repossession of the Plaintiffs truck by the Defendants was a wrongful conversion of the truck and
items of personal property as a matter of law. On April 3rd and 4th of this year the Court heard
evidence and argument resulting in Memorandum Decision of April 9, 2001 wherein damages to
both plaintiffs were determined. At that time the Defendant objected to the application of the
collateral source doctrine to proof that the Plaintiff had already been paid for some of his losses.
The Court invited further briefing and argument on that point and, further, evidence related to
punitive damages which had not been received before the Memorandum Decision in accordance
with Utah Code Annotated §78-18-1(2). Having now heard the additional evidence and argument
the Court makes the following ruling.
Collateral Source Rule
Restatement Second of Torts §920 A allows a credit against the liability of a tortfeasor for
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payments made by another subject to the same tort liability but not for payments made or benefits
conferred on the injured partyfromother sources "although they cover all or apart of the harm
for which the tortfeasor is liable'7 In this case Mr. Mahana received a benefit from co-Plaintiff
Rick Warner Toyota in the form of cars to drive while he was without his truck. It was also
proffered that he, along with Defendant Onyx Acceptance Corp., recovered on a bond posted in
Arizona when an application was made for a new title to the truck in question. While Rick
Warner Toyota may have had potential exposure to a claimfromMr. Mahana on a warranty of
title theory, that would not have been the same tort liability that has been determined to accrue to
Onyx Acceptance because of the wrongful repossession. Moreover, the bond posted by someone
previous to Mr. Mahana in the chain of title to the truck is plainly collateral to and independent of
both Onyx Acceptance, Mr. Mahana and Rick Warner. This Court concludes that the collateral
source rule was properly applied in this case and that evidence of payment on the Arizona bond
may not be used to reduce the liability of the Defendants in this case.
Punitive Damages
This Court has determined, by clear and convincing evidence, that Onyx Acceptance
Corporation is responsible for punitive damages because their conduct in this case demonstrated a
"knowing and indifferent reckless toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others." This Court
interpreted a statute hard to read and understand in the first memorandum decision rendered on
September 23, 1999. The conclusion was that Onyx Acceptance Corporation did not have the
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lien priority it claimed during the repossession and in this litigation. That misunderstanding alone,
however, is not the basis for this Court's determination of liability for punitive damages. There
was no evidence, at ail, that Onyx Acceptance Corporation made any attempt to consider or plan
what to do when or if this circumstance arose. There were no policies or procedures and no
specific training to non-lawyer supervisors called upon to make decisions. Even more serious,
however, the corporation was presented with specific information that should have warned of a
problem. They knew that a new Arizona title had been issued. They new a clean Utah title to Mr.
Mahana had been issued. They were told of Mr. Mahana's status by someone from his family, by
his bank and by his dealer. The response was to demand "proof and to proceed at best possible
speed to get the vehicle out of the State of Utah and sold, with notice only to the last known
address of the California debtor. The conduct for which this Court has concluded punitive
damages should be assessed is the repossession and sale of the vehicle while deliberately ignoring
substantial evidence that they should not have proceeded.
The Utah Supreme Court has identified 7 factors to be considered in assessing the amount
of punitive damages to be awarded, Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 at 808
(Utah, 1991). First is the relative wealth of the Defendant. The Supreme Court did not clearly
define to what the wealth of the Defendant should relate. Nevertheless, by any standard, Onyx
Acceptance Corporation is a wealthy corporation. It is a publicly traded corporation which does
business in at least 20 states. The corporation services over 2 billion dollars worth of consumer
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loans. Total assets for the year 1999 are over $393 million. Net stockholders equity for 1999
was over 53 million. Payment of the total damages of approximately $15,000.00 in this case will
not cause substantialfinancialhardship. Counsel has intimated and the Court suspects that the
litigation costs alone for the Defendant will substantially exceed the damage total.
The second factor is the nature of the alleged misconduct which has been described above.
Counsel have taken interesting and opposite positions on the nature of the conduct and the
application of §78-18-1. Counsel for the Defendant argues that because the third Crookston
factor specifically refers to the facts and circumstances of this case this second factor must be
something different. He posits that the three possible proofs for punitive damages create a
spectrum of less to more culpable damages: "willful and malicious;" to "intentionally fraudulent;"
to "knowing and reckless indifference toward and disregard of, the rights of others." Counsel
suggests that willful and malicious is the most culpable, intentionally fraudulent less so and
knowing and reckless indifference represents the least culpable. On the other hand, Counsel for
the Plaintiflf argues that if the intent of punitive damages is to deter future conduct, it may be more
difficult to educate a tortfeasor of wrongful conduct that is reckless than to convince such a
tortfeasor that willful, malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct is wrong. Both are interesting
arguments but neither is supported by any authority. This Court rejects both positions. Onyx
Acceptance Corporation should be punished because they were recklessly indifferent to the rights
of Mr. Mahana. If the statute calls for a comparison of this behavior to other possible wrongful
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behavior, relevant evidence would be burdensome and, indeed, overwhelming. It would also be
inherently inaccurate. The Court is satisfied that the second factor seeks to address the actual
behavior, whether malicious, willfixl, intentional or reckless, that may in some way create a reason
for punishment or deterrence, beyond the mere assessment of actual damages. This is such a case.
The Third factor discusses the facts and circumstances surrounding such conduct. In this
case with regard to the Defendants or the purchase of the truck, Mr. Mahana did absolutely
nothing wrong. He bought a truck from a recognized dealer for good consideration and made his
payments.1 Onyx Acceptance Corporation strenuously argues that it, too, was the victim of
scurrilous behavior by someone in the chain of title above Mahana. They claim that either the
original borrower, Mr. Hartley, or one of the subsequent purchasers had to have committed a tort
and/or a crime to get the clean Arizona title without paying off the Onyx Acceptance loan, first.
The truck was located for repossession only after substantial effort over some period of time. In
short, while there was absolutely no culpability shown on behalf of Mr. Mahana, the
circumstances of this repossession are as important as any other factor in defining the culpability
of Onyx Acceptance Corporation.

x

The Court notes that the behavior of Mr. Mahana's father at the GLS Recovery yard was
absolutely unreasonable and inappropriate. The Court has concluded that the behavior did not
substantially contribute to the decision by Onyx Acceptance Corporation to quickly remove the
truckfromthe state because the evidence indicates that no report of the incident was made in
such a way as to impact that decision. Moreover, while if Mr. Mahana, himself, had behaved in
such an unruly and unreasonable fashion it would be considered against him, there is no evidence
or indication that he expected, encouraged or participated in the conduct.
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The fourth factor is the effect on the lives of the Plaintiff and others. The Plaintiff has
been compensated for the damage to his lifestyle by the award of compensatory damages. There
was no evidence that any damages from this incident are permanent. This is a non-factor in the
view of the Court.
The fifth factor is "the probability of future recurrence of the misconduct." The Court
does have some concern in this area. As noted above, there was little or no training or instruction
given to agents of Onyx Acceptance regarding this type of circumstance. The representative of
Onyx Acceptance testified that as a result of this case an updated procedure had been circulated
by e-mail. The Court's impression, however, was that this was not a formalized, completed
policy but was, instead, the beginnings of a discussion about a policy. Nothing in writing was
produced. With Onyx Acceptance handling so many accounts (two and a half billion dollars in
serviced loans) the gain from simply ignoring the "little guy" and repossessing and selling as
quickly as possible may well outweigh the cost involved in carefully checking the title whenever
otherwise warranted, as in this case. Consideration of this factor would indicate that substantial
damages to enhance the onus of this kind of conduct might be proper.
The sixth factor is the relationship of the parties. The parties in this case had no
relationship, beyond their mutual interest in the truck. This is not a factor in this case.
Thefinalfactor, and the only one that has been carefully explained in the Utah decisions, is
the amount of actual damages awarded. As noted above, total damages to Mr. Mahana from

Page 6 o f

8

Onyx Acceptance are $12,925.89. Crookston supra, seems to indicate that an award of up to
three times this amount would not be scrutinized so carefully as an award of more than that
amount.
In summary, Onyx Acceptance is a large company with the capacity to cover the damages
in this case without significant impact upon its overallfinancialcondition. The corporation
appears to have made little or no attempt to safeguard or otherwise be concerned with the rights
of individuals such as Mr. Mahana who may end up with possession of property the corporation
identifies as collateral. The corporation had substantial opportunity and warning to determine the
rights of Mr. Mahana but didn't. Instead, they went after the collateral as quickly and
aggressively as they could. There is a possibility that this conduct will be repeated unless the
consequence in any one case is not substantial enough to make it economically unfeasible to
continue the conduct. Based upon these factors and the nature of the conduct in this case the
Court concludes that a punitive damages award of $25,000.00, approximately twice the amount
of compensatory damages, is a reasonable amount in this case.
Counsel for the Plaintiff is directed to preparefindings,an order and a judgment consistent
with the decisions of this Court in accordance with Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial
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Administration. Counsel is particularly directed to accommodate §78-18-1(3) in thefinalorder.
Dated this 20th day ofJune, 2001

Fames R. Taylor
Fourth Judicial District

Copies of this Order mailed to:
Counsel for the Plaintiff:
P. Bryan Fishburn
Michael D. Misner
4505 South Wasatch Boulevard, Suite 215
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Counsel for the Defendant:
Evan A. Schmutz
Curtis R. Hussey
Jamestown Square, Suite 200
3319 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604
Mailed this

day of

CW^J3_,

2001, postage pre-paid as noted above.
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FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah
Deputy
FISHBURN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
P. BRYAN FISHBURN, ESQ. (#A4572)
MICHAEL D. MISNER, ESQ. (#A8742)
4505 South Wasatch Boulevard, Suite #215
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Telephone: (801) 277-3445
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

CHRIS S. MAHANA and RICK
WARNER TOYOTA,

ORDER ON MOTION TO
RECONSIDER AND FOR
CLARIFICATION REGARDING
COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 990400472

ONYX ACCEPTANCE
CORPORATION and GLS
RECOVERY, INC.,

Judge James Taylor

Defendants.

* * * * * * *

Before the Court is Defendants' MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND FOR
CLARIFICATION REGARDING COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE.
The Court has read the Motion, Defendants' supporting memoranda, and
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition. The Court also received oral argument from
the parties' counsel at a hearing held on June 14, 2001, wherein Defendants and

movants were represented by Evan Schmutz, Esq., and Plaintiffs were represented by
Michael Misner, Esq.
Consistent with the Court's ruling as stated at the hearing and GOOD CAUSE
APPEARING, THE COURT ORDERS AND DECREES AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The Defendants' motion is DENIED;

2.

The damages to which Plaintiffs are entitled will not be reduced by a
recovery from a collateral source.

DATED this / A

day of

^ 1 ^ / ^

-2-

, 2001.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER ON
MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND FOR CLARIFICATION REGARDING
COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE was mailed, postage prepaid, on the fec£r day of
-4c*^>- 2001, to the following:
1 "Z*
Evan A. Schmutz, Esq.
Curtis R. Hussey, Esq.
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, LC.
Jamestown Square, Suite 200
3319 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604

By.
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FISHBURN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
P. BRYAN FISHBURN, ESQ. (#A4572)
MICHAEL D. MISNER, ESQ. (#A8742)
4505 South Wasatch Boulevard, Suite #215
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Telephone: (801) 277-3445

Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

-J^lL^Lf

DepuK

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CHRIS S. MAHANA and RICK WARNER
TOYOTA,
j

ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Civil No. 990400472

Plaintiff,
Judge James Taylor

vs.
ONYX ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION
and GLS RECOVERY, INC.,
Defendants.

On September 23, 1999, the Court entered partial summary judgment in favor of
Plaintiff Chris Mahana, holding that Defendants were liable to him in tort for conversion.
Remaining issues of liability, compensatory damages, and Mahana's claim for punitive
damages was tried April 3 and 4, 2001. Trial was reconvened June 14, 2001 for the limited
purpose of receiving evidence as to the wealth and financial assets of defendant Onyx
Acceptance Corporation.

The holdings of this court following the two phases of trial are explained in a
Memorandum Decision dated April 9, 2001 and a Memorandum Decision dated June 20, 2001.
Having received evidence on damages and the remaining issues of liability at trial, and having
ruled on the issues presented to it,
THE COURT ENTERS JUDGMENT AS FOLLOWS:
1.

That plaintiff Chris Mahana recover of defendants Onyx Acceptance
Corporation and GLS Recovery, Inc., jointly and severally, compensatory
damages for conversion and lost use of his pickup in the amount of $11,880.00
with prejudgment interest thereon at 10 percent per annum from April 4, 2000
until entry of this Judgment.

2.

That plaintiff Chris Mahana recover of defendants Onyx Acceptance
Corporation and GLS Recovery, Inc., jointly and severally, compensatory
damages for the conversion of personal property other than the pickup in the
amount of $1,045.89 with prejudgment interest thereon from November 16,
1998 until entry of this Judgment.

3.

That plaintiff Rick Warner Toyota recover of defendants Onyx Acceptance
Corporation and GLS Recovery, Inc., jointly and severally, damages in the
amount of $2,075.00 with prejudgment interest thereon at 10 percent per annum
from April 4, 2000 until entry of this Judgment.

4.

That plaintiff Chris Mahana recover of Onyx Acceptance Corporation punitive
damages in the amount of $25,000.00.

MAHANA\ORDER2NDVERSION

~2~

That plaintiffs, as the prevailing parties in this action, recover of Onyx
Acceptance Corporation and/or GLS Recovery, Inc. costs of court in the sum of
$1,737.80.
Interest will accrue on the Judgment entered at the rate of 7.34 percent per
annum until paid.
DATED this / /

day of

FOU

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing [proposed] ORDER AND
JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, on the /S£ day of September 2001, to the
following:
0€T»4«
Evan A. Schmutz, Esq.
Curtis R. Hussey, Esq.
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, LC.
Jamestown Square, Suite 200
3319 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604

By.
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